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Abstract
Purpose – Strategic alliances involve uncertainty, interdependence, and vulnerability, which often
create adverse situations. This paper seeks to understand how alliance managers respond to these
adverse situations by examining the influence of four exchange variables on response strategies.
Design/methodology/approach – A scenario-based experiment provides empirical support for a
typology consisting of seven conceptually and empirically distinct response strategies: exit,
opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect.
Findings – The results indicate that economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, alliance-specific
investments, and the availability of attractive alternatives differentially and interactively affect
response strategies.
Research limitations/implications – The study offers two main contributions to alliance
literature. First, the seven response strategies accurately represent reactions that alliance managers
use to deal with adverse situations. Second, the study findings validate and extend previous alliance
research by highlighting that a comprehensive response strategy typology is necessary to disentangle
the effects of the four exchange conditions on response strategy use, which fosters theory development
and managers’ ability to manage their alliances effectively.
Originality/value – The study contributes to the process perspective on strategic alliances by
highlighting the various response strategies that alliance managers use to deal with adverse situations
and their antecedents.
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Introduction
The past several decades have witnessed enormous growth in alliance activity (Das
and Kumar, 2010), and strategic alliances apparently have established themselves as
cornerstones for the competitive strategy of many firms, enabling those firms to
achieve objectives that otherwise would be difficult to realize (Das and Teng, 2000).
However, alliances still tend to exhibit a mix of promise and peril. Whereas alliances
enable firms to capitalize on opportunities, managers must remain responsive to the
threat of adverse situations. For example, alliance managers may need to resolve
dissatisfying alliance performance issues, improve poor working relationships, and
deal with the negative consequences of exit barriers, such as alliance-specific
investments and a lack of attractive external alternatives. Alliance managers also must
respond to avoid the premature termination of the alliance, which may hamper the
realization of their firms’ strategic objectives (Das and Kumar, 2007; Makino et al.,
2007). The high failure rate of alliances (e.g. Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005) demands a
better understanding of responses to adverse situations and their determinants. To
make this contribution to alliance literature, we formulate two research questions:
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(1) What is the range of response strategies from which alliance managers can
choose?
(2) When do they use these different response strategies?
Consistent with previous alliance studies (Buckley, 1999; Geyskens and Steenkamp,
2000; Griffith, 2006), we define a response strategy as a reaction to an adverse situation.
Although extant empirical research demonstrates that managers use various response
strategies to overcome adverse situations (e.g. Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Brouthers
and Bamossy, 2006), a comprehensive typology of response strategies in the alliance
context remains lacking. Most alliance studies focus a single type of responses, such as
alliance termination (Park and Ungson, 1997), opportunistic behavior (Deeds and Hill,
1998), or voice (Ping, 1997). Such focused approaches undermine the development of an
integrative vision that might clarify alliance managers’ alternative use of response
strategies. To overcome this shortcoming, several studies adopt response strategy
typologies from other fields (e.g. Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993, 1999), yet
those typologies include a limited number of generic responses (e.g. exit, voice, loyalty,
neglect) and cannot cover the full range of alternative responses used by alliance
managers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers respond to adverse situations
in ways that existing typologies describe only poorly, hampering further theory
development. To overcome this limitation, we extend the exit-voice-loyalty-neglect
(EVLN) typology (Farrell, 1983; Rusbult and Zembrodt, 1983) with three additional
responses: creative voice, aggressive voice, and opportunism.
To recognize when alliance managers are more likely to use particular response
strategies, we also extend prior alliance research by investigating the effect of adverse
situations according to the impact of four exchange variables: economic satisfaction,
social satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and alliance-specific investments. The
simultaneous examination of these four exchange conditions enables us to disentangle
confounding effects; to the best of our knowledge, no previous alliance study examines
these variables in a single study. For example, Ping (1993) considers the effect of
overall satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and investments, and Geyskens and
Steenkamp (2000) distinguish between economic and social satisfaction, but neither
examines other exchange variables. Whereas Ping’s (1997) results indicate that overall
satisfaction positively influences the use of voice, Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000)
report that social satisfaction, not economic satisfaction, relates to voice. Moreover,
their findings suggest that economic and social satisfaction directly and interactively
influence response strategies. Thus, research needs to consider the interaction between
economic and social satisfaction. Regarding the effect of exit barriers, Ping (1993, 2003)
reveals that investments and alternative attractiveness differentially affect the use of
response strategies, such that alternative attractiveness significantly influences exit,
opportunism, and neglect, whereas investments significantly influence voice and
neglect. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the effects of the two different types of
exit barriers, as well as their interaction. By proposing and assessing an extended
typology of response strategies to adverse situations in strategic alliances and then
examining the conditions in which particular responses are more likely, we contribute
to alliance process literature (e.g. Gulati et al., 1994) and provide a finer-grained
understanding of the postformation responses used by managers who face adverse
situations.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows: First, we identify the need for
an extended typology of seven response strategies. Second, on the basis of a review of
alliance research on response strategies, we develop a set of hypotheses that relate the
four exchange variables to each response strategy. Third, we explicate the
experimental design we use to test the hypotheses. Fourth, we present the results
and conclude with a discussion of the academic and managerial implications of the
results, as well as directions for further research.
Responses to adverse situations in strategic alliances
A recurring theme in alliance literature pertaining to post-formation processes relates
to how managers respond to adverse situations as a means to achieve alliance goals
and improve performance (Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996). For example, Doz
(1996) indicates that to succeed over time, alliances must adapt their tasks, routines,
performance expectations, and objectives. Arin˜o and De la Torre (1998) also identify
different adjustment or response strategies that managers use to adapt an alliance,
improve performance, and avoid premature termination. If alliance partners cannot
reach an agreement, the aggrieved partner must take unilateral corrective action,
which likely deteriorates the relationship. Other studies show that alliance managers
overcome adverse situations by implementing constructive adaptations (Brouthers and
Bamossy, 2006; Reuer and Arin˜o, 2002). However, these studies consistently focus on
explaining alliance performance rather than understanding managers’ reactions. To
explicate alliance managers’ reactions, a particular stream of alliance research (e.g.
Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993) borrows a typology of
response strategies originally developed by Hirschman (1970) to explain the responses
of organizations to declining performance and furthered in various other management
fields.
Response strategies: the ELVN typology
Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty framework provides the foundation for an
important stream of research regarding response strategies. Hirschman initially
represented exit, voice, and loyalty as three alternative strategies along a
constructive-destructive spectrum (Leck and Saunders, 1992). Extending Hirschman’s
framework with a fourth strategy, namely neglect, Farrell (1983) and Rusbult and
Zembrodt (1983) propose the ELVN (exit-voice-loyalty-neglect) typology, which
represents a parsimonious conceptualization of response strategies and derives its
strength from the underlying two-dimensional structure into which the four response
strategies are organized: an active-passive dimension and a constructive-destructive
dimension. The alliance context defines the four EVLN response strategies as follows.
Exit, an active-destructive response, indicates a disinclination to continue the
current relationship (Ping, 1999). Alliance literature thus refers to exit as an alliance
termination (e.g. Makino et al., 2007; Park and Ungson, 1997) that represents the
ultimate and most destructive response to an adverse situation; once the alliance is
dissolved, partner firms must find alternative ways to achieve their objectives. Voice is
an attempt to overcome the adverse situation by considering own concerns, as well of
those of the other party (Ping, 1997, 2003), such that alliance managers actively and
constructively discuss the situation with the intent to develop mutually satisfactory
solutions (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard et al., 2001). Therefore, voice
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represents an active attempt to change, rather than escape from, the situation by
contacting the partner in a relationship-preserving manner and cooperatively
discussing the problem (Ping, 1999). However, in silently abiding issues, with the
confidence that things will improve in the future (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000;
Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993), loyalty (also called patience[1]) provides a
constructive-passive response. Managers voluntarily ignore the issue and hope that the
adverse situation resolves by itself, so they consider undesirable circumstances
transitory phenomena that will dissipate over time (Ping, 1993). Finally, neglect, a
passive-destructive response, involves allowing the relationship to deteriorate (Ping,
1993, 1999). A neglectful manager expends little effort to maintain the alliance (Pressey
and Qu, 2007), and possible ways to solve the situation get ignored, such that the
relationship eventually dies (Ping, 1993).
Because they developed in contexts other than strategic alliances, the four EVLN
strategies do not address the entire range of alternatives actually used by alliance
managers. For the typology to correspond to the alliance context, we need to add the
strategies that alliance managers use, as identified in alliance literature. As Rusbult
et al. (1988) suggest, the ELVN typology may serve as a common framework into
which research should incorporate additional responses adapted to specific contexts.
Additional response strategies
Extending previous alliance research based on the EVLN typology (Geyskens and
Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993), we propose the addition of three supplementary
response strategies: aggressive voice, creative voice, and opportunism. Hirschman
(1970, p. 39) initially conceptualized voice in a relatively neutral manner as “any
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape an objectionable state of affairs”. In the
EVLN typology, voice mostly suggests a positive approach, involving the constructive
discussion of issues with the intent to find mutually satisfactory solutions (e.g. Ping,
1993). However, empirical studies (e.g. Rusbult et al., 1988; Withey and Cooper, 1989)
report low internal consistency for voice, suggesting that it might be a more complex
construct with several subcomponents (Kay, 1989; Withey and Cooper, 1989). In
addition to its positive dimension, voice may have a negative connotation, such as
direct aggressive criticism or coercion (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Hibbard et al., 2001).
Moreover, expressions of voice might be aimed at developing creative and innovative
solutions (e.g. Kay, 1989; Zhou and George, 2001). Following Hagedoorn et al. (1999),
we call the EVLN type of voice “considerate” and define it as a manager’s active efforts
to seek to resolve an adverse situation by contacting a counterpart in a
relationship-preserving manner and cooperatively discussing the problem to
improve the situation (Ping, 1999). Das and Kumar (2010) refer to this type of voice
as inter-partner sensemaking. We therefore distinguish this type of voice from two
other forms: aggressive and creative.
Aggressive voice refers to an active-destructive response strategy that consists of
persistent efforts by one partner to solve undesirable situations, regardless of the ideas
and preferences of the counterpart (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). In an alliance context,
aggressive voice suggests managers forcefully impose their solutions, without trying
to avoid conflicts (Hibbard et al., 2001). Anecdotal evidence indicates that alliance
managers may coerce partners into one-sided solutions (Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998;
De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004; Doz, 1996). For example, De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004),
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p. 62) analyze the formation and development of a strategic alliance between two
pharmaceutical firms (Plethora and Rummidgen, not real names) and describe several
examples of the use of aggressive voice: “Rummidgen persisted, and [. . .] persuaded
Plethora to abandon mixtures in favor of a single-compounds approach” or
“Rummidgen now demanded a 20 per cent increase in funding above and beyond the
sum agreed with Plethora two years earlier”. These illustrations highlight not only that
aggressive voice is one of multiple possible responses in strategic alliances but also
that it is conceptually different from considerate voice (Hibbard et al., 2001).
Creative voice, the third type, refers to the generation of novel and potentially useful
solutions to an adverse situation (Zhou and George, 2001). In a qualitative study, Kay
(1989) finds that prototypical voice behaviors include “propose new ways of doing
things” and “make suggestions on how to improve things”, both of which are
consistent with definitions of creativity. In an alliance context, creativity or creative
voice consists of a partner trying to overcome the adverse situation through innovative
solutions (Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006; Doz, 1996). Arin˜o and De la Torre (1998)
indicate that during the start-up phase of a joint venture, partners exhibit willingness
to find innovative solutions, beyond the scope of their contractual agreement, to align
their interests and preserve the relationship. Doz (1996) also demonstrates that
partners proceed through learning cycles that enable them to develop creative
solutions to deal with adverse situations. Creative voice therefore differs from
aggressive voice with respect to purpose: Whereas creative voice is constructive and
takes into account the counterpart’s interests, aggressive voice is more destructive and
focuses on the interests of the manager’s own firm. Creative and considerate voices also
are conceptually distinct, in that creative voice pertains to the intention to seek
out-of-the-box solutions rather than cooperatively discuss the problem to improve the
situation.
Opportunism as a response strategy also represents an active-destructive response
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). Ping (1993) defines opportunism as the intention to increase
a partner’s benefits from the relationship in ways that are explicitly or implicitly
prohibited within the relationship. This type of response includes shirking, the use of
the circumstances to extract concessions from the other party, the evasion of
obligations, and the withholding of critical information (Das, 2005; Wathne and Heide,
2000). Several studies examine opportunism within the context of strategic alliances
and argue that it constitutes a distinct response (Deeds and Hill, 1998; Doz, 1996;
Johnson et al., 1996; Judge and Dooley, 2006; Luo, 2007). For example, in an
examination of pharmaceutical alliances, Doz (1996, p. 72) reports comments such as,
“we knew they were doing some work on TTS that they would not share with us . . . ,
we always felt that CG had information they should have fed back to us, but did not”
and “CG lacked confidence that we could turn ourselves around. They started making
openings to our people”. Opportunism occurs when a partner seeks to maximize its
individual returns at the expense of its partners (Deeds and Hill, 1998), which makes it
conceptually different from aggressive voice. Although both responses imply that a
partner has the intention to pursue its individual interests, aggressive voice directly
targets the firm’s counterpart and attempts to coerce it to complying with its demands,
whereas opportunism is covert behavior aimed at deceiving the counterpart ( John,
1984; Joshi and Arnold, 1997).
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Hypothesis development
Prior research on the EVLN typology in an alliance context identifies not only different
types of responses but also their antecedents. In previous studies, social exchange
theory (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005) and interdependence theory
(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) provide the dominant theoretical perspectives used to
examine the effects of such antecedents. Drawing on these theories, Rusbult et al. (1982)
develop and find empirical support for an investment model in which three exchange
variables influence the conditions most likely to initiate a response: the degree of
satisfaction with the relationship, the magnitude of investment of resources in the
relationship, and the quality of the best available alternative to the relationship. We
distinguish among four similar exchange variables: economic satisfaction, social
satisfaction, alliance specific investments, and availability of alternatives.
Each exchange variable represents a manifestation of the adverse situations
alliance managers likely confront. Poor economic satisfaction demands a response,
because it endangers firms’ long-term performance; poor social satisfaction prompts
managers to respond because it increases the costs of managing the alliance. In terms
of exit barriers, both alliance-specific investments and the lack of attractive
alternatives outside the alliance increase the costs of terminating the alliance by
creating potential hold-up situations. Alliance-specific investments constitute a source
of dependence, opening the door to exploitation (Klein et al., 1978), which pushes
managers to respond and restore a balance of power to protect their investments. The
lack of alternatives also creates a potential hold-up situation, but managers likely
respond to it differently, because such dependence increases the relative value of the
relationship and should stimulate managers to act in the interest of the alliance. Thus,
managers are likely to respond, though differently, to all four-exchange conditions.
We base our hypotheses on the assumption of an ongoing strategic alliance between
two partner firms engaged in a long-term relationship. The level of analysis therefore
considers a manager responding to an adverse situation related to the alliance
(Chatman, 1989). In this context, managers assess the exchange context and respond to
adverse situations to achieve their firms’ strategic objectives.
Economic satisfaction
Economic satisfaction represents a partner’s evaluation of the financial outcomes of the
relationship (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000).
According to Geyskens et al. (1999), an economically satisfied manager considers the
alliance a success with respect to goal attainment, effectiveness, productivity, and the
resulting financial outcomes. Low economic satisfaction implies that partners perceive
a discrepancy between prior expectations and desired financial results (Geyskens et al.,
1999), which requires managers to respond to the situation to achieve their firm’s
alliance objectives.
As Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) argue, when economic satisfaction is low,
managers tend to perceive the alliance as less valuable and may not respond
constructively. Furthermore, because poor financial performance endangers
shareholder value, managers likely respond actively rather than passively; this poor
financial performance creates a sense of urgency that forces managers to adopt
responses aimed at improving the situation rapidly (Das, 2005, 2006). Neglecting the
situation or waiting patiently for an improvement is less likely, because these response
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strategies may lead to further financial distress. Managers are also less likely to use
considerate voice, which may be too slow to turn around the situation. In contrast,
creativity often results from the pressure of an immediate need to find a solution
(Amabile, 1988), and poor economic satisfaction may prompt alliance managers to
“rock the boat” by using aggressive voice and opportunism to restore performance or
extract additional benefits from the alliance quickly (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ping, 1993). If
they perceive that it is too costly or time-consuming to improve the situation, managers
may give up and exit the alliance (Lewis and Lambert, 1991).
Some of these relationships receive support in empirical studies. For example,
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) find that in marketing channel relationships,
economic satisfaction positively influences loyalty (i.e. patience) and negatively affects
exit. However, the relationship between economic satisfaction and voice is not
significant, probably because they operationalize voice as a mixture of considerate and
creative factors. Both these authors and Ping (1993) find a slight negative relationship
between economic satisfaction and neglect and argue that the value of the alliance
increases with its financial performance, which should reduce negligence. However, we
posit that when alliance performance is poor, negligence may not be an option for
improving the situation and therefore expect a positive relationship between economic
satisfaction and neglect. Furthermore, in a study of retailers’ response intentions, Ping
(1993) reveals that overall satisfaction, which includes an economic component, is
significantly and negatively associated with exit but positively associated with a
considerate form of voice (see also Ping, 1997, 1999). No significant relationship
emerges with opportunism or patience, probably due to Ping’s use of a broad measure
of overall satisfaction instead of economic satisfaction, as suggested by Geyskens and
Steenkamp (2000). The relationship between economic satisfaction and exit also
receives support from Delios et al. (2004), who indicate that poor long-term economic
performance eases the trajectory toward alliance termination, and by Olk and Young
(1997), who find that satisfaction with the alliance performance positively influences
continuity. In addition, Lee et al. (2007) confirm the relationship between economic
satisfaction and considerate voice; in the importer-exporter relationships in their study,
an importer’s economic satisfaction positively influences benevolence, which they
define as showing consideration and sensitivity to the needs of the partner.
Finally, several studies find anecdotal support for the effect of economic satisfaction
on other response strategies. For example, Brouthers and Bamossy (2006), studying
post-formation processes in international joint ventures, indicate that alliance
managers who report poor performance compared with those who claim strong
performance exhibit fewer efforts to develop innovative processes, build trust, or
optimize management control (i.e. creative voice) but more use of aggressive voice,
such as threats of legal action. In a marketing channel, John (1984) also describes a
positive relationship between retail dealers’ economic satisfaction and opportunism.
Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1 Compared with alliance managers who perceive low economic satisfaction,
alliance managers who perceive high economic satisfaction are less likely to
exit, behave opportunistically, and use aggressive and creative voices but are
more likely to use considerate voice, be patient, and be neglectful.
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Social satisfaction
Social satisfaction pertains to managers’ evaluation of the psychosocial aspects of the
relationship; it implies that interactions with partners are fulfilling, gratifying, and
facile (Geyskens et al., 1999; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). An important aspect of
social satisfaction thus involves managers’ perception of the relational quality of their
alliances. Partners satisfied with the relationship appreciate contacts with their
counterparts, and the relationship likely is characterized by trust, respect, and
commitment (Arin˜o et al., 2001). Alliances characterized by poor relational quality
suffer dysfunctional conflicts, distrust, and low commitment, which is, low social
satisfaction (Anderson and Narus, 1990). To achieve their firms’ strategic objectives,
alliance managers likely respond to situations of low relational quality, which increase
the costs of managing and monitoring partners (Lui and Ngo, 2004).
Social satisfaction builds over the long run when partners work together (Arin˜o
et al., 2001). Because rebuilding damaged relational quality may be too time
consuming, managers dissatisfied with the relationship quality of an alliance may
disengage or terminate the relationship rather than try to save it through constructive
responses. Furthermore, low social satisfaction creates greater suspicion about the
intentions of the partner and results in reduced expectations about the future benefits
of the relationship. Without trust, respect, and commitment, managers become less
worried about endangering the relationship and may act opportunistically to extract
additional benefits (Deeds and Hill, 1998). They also tend to see little hope for a quick
recovery and reduce their level of commitment and cooperation, which eventually
results in neglectful behaviors (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Alliance managers
may believe that aggressive voice, though unlikely to result in a substantial
improvement, still provides some psychic benefits (Hibbard et al., 2001), because it
enables them to communicate their dissatisfaction. Therefore, low relationship quality
should result in less constructive responses (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Brouthers and
Bamossy, 2006) and lesser usage of creative or considerate voice (Geyskens and
Steenkamp, 2000). The relationship between social satisfaction and patience may be
more complex though. Hibbard et al. (2001) argue that managers with positive views of
the relationship place less importance on the adverse situation and remain patient,
believing that the transient negative situation will improve. Yet, Geyskens and
Steenkamp (2000), contrary to their expectations, find that loyalty (i.e. patience)
declines, as-a-result of social satisfaction. They therefore argue that passivity may be
acceptable when economic satisfaction is high but not when the relationship is socially
satisfying, which instead calls for more active and constructive responses. We follow
their argument.
In a marketing channel context, Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) show that social
satisfaction relates negatively to exit, patience, and neglect and positively to voice,
which they operationalize as considerate (e.g. try to discuss the problem, talk
constructively about how we feel about the situation) and creative (e.g. try to solve the
problem by suggesting changes) terms. Their results receive support from Hibbard
et al. (2001), who also find a positive association between social satisfaction and
considerate voice but a negative relation to exit and neglect. However, they find a
positive relationship between social satisfaction and patience. In addition, the negative
relationship that Hibbard et al. (2001) hypothesize between social satisfaction and
aggressive voice is not significant. Furthermore, several studies provide indirect
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support for a negative relationship between social satisfaction and opportunism:
Dwyer et al. (1987) indicate that a high-quality relationship involves minimal
opportunism, Judge and Dooley (2006) report a negative association between trust and
opportunism, and Deeds and Hill (1998) find that relational quality serves as an
effective deterrent to opportunistic behavior. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H2 Compared with alliance managers who perceive low social satisfaction,
alliance managers who perceive high social satisfaction are less likely to be
patient or neglectful, exit, behave opportunistically, and use aggressive voice
but are more likely to use creative and considerate voices.
Interaction between economic and social satisfaction
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) argue that economic and social satisfaction represent
two different routes for alliance partners to achieve alliance objectives. When economic
satisfaction is low, the effect of social satisfaction becomes more important, and vice
versa. According to their results, the likelihood of destructive response strategies
declines with economic satisfaction and social satisfaction, and social satisfaction is
more effective in discouraging destructive responses in the face of low economic
satisfaction, though when economic satisfaction is high, social satisfaction has only a
weak effect. In addition, when economic satisfaction is low, social satisfaction becomes
more important as a positive influence on constructive responses and reducing the
likelihood of destructive strategies.
Several studies report interaction effects between economic and social satisfaction.
Morgan and Hunt (1994) indicate that when social satisfaction improves, so does the
relationship’s efficiency, because relational quality enhances the alliance function by
positively influencing trust and commitment building. Arin˜o and De la Torre (1998)
also show that a firm can also accomplish its alliance objectives indirectly by creating
higher levels of social satisfaction. The insignificant effect Ping (1993) notes between
overall satisfaction and loyalty (i.e. patience) may result from a negative interaction
effect between the two types of satisfaction, which could have cancelled each other out
(Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Therefore, we hypothesize:
H3 A negative interaction effect exists between economic and social satisfaction
on an alliance manager’s likelihood of using the seven response strategies.
When an alliance manager perceives high (low) economic satisfaction, the
effect of perceived social satisfaction is weaker (stronger).
Alliance-specific investments
Alliance-specific investments are sunk costs that cannot be redeployed easily to
another relationship without some sacrifice in the productivity of the assets or cost in
adapting them to the new context (Klein et al., 1978). When such investments are
unilateral and would be lost if the alliance were dissolved, they act as exit barriers
(Porter, 1980). Therefore, their presence constitutes a source of dependence (Emerson,
1962; Klein et al., 1978), which Williamson (1993) considers poor managerial practice
that reflects myopic decision-making. Such investments create an adverse situation
that causes managers to try to preserve the relationship and reduce the negative
consequences of their firms’ vulnerable position (Emerson, 1962).
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The presence of alliance-specific investments should trigger constructive response
strategies and inhibit destructive ones (Hirschman, 1970; Ping, 1993, 2003), because
constructive responses, such as patience and constructive and creative voice, enable
managers to preserve the benefits from their investments while reducing the risk of
losing them were the relationship to terminate prematurely (Arin˜o and De la Torre,
1998). When alliance-specific investments are high, managers likely contact their
partners and work cooperatively to resolve problems and maintain the relationship
(Gulati et al., 1994; Ping, 2003). Conversely, by increasing the costs of terminating the
alliance, alliance-specific investments reduce the likelihood of exit and any response
that could prompt the partner to exit, such as opportunism, aggressive voice, and
neglect (Deeds and Hill, 1998; Delios et al., 2004; Wathne and Heide, 2000).
Several empirical studies provide support for the relationships between
alliance-specific investments and response strategies. In the context of supply chain
management, Ping (1993) reveals that investments positively influence a considerate
form of voice and negatively influence neglect. However, he finds no significant
relationships with exit, opportunism, or patience, whereas Anderson (1988) cites a
relationship with opportunism. Anderson and Weitz (1992) report that alliance-specific
investments associate negatively with exit, and Ping (2003) offers support for a
positive relationship between investments and a considerate form of voice. Finally, in
an organizational context, Farrell and Rusbult (1992) suggest that investments
positively influence loyalty (i.e. patience).
Other alliance studies provide additional support: Reuer and Arin˜o (2002) highlight
a strong positive relationship between asset specificity and negotiated governance
changes (i.e. considerate voice), and Delios et al. (2004) find that investments
significantly reduce the likelihood of exit in international strategic alliances. To the
best of our knowledge, no empirical studies directly investigate the effect of
alliance-specific investments on aggressive and creative voices. However, Klein’s
(2000) account of the relationship between Fisher Body and General Motors suggests
that the presence of specific investments reduces aggressive voice and increases
creative voice. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H4 Compared with alliance managers who perceive low alliance-specific
investments, alliance managers who perceive high alliance-specific
investments are more likely to be patient and use considerate and creative
voice but are less likely to exit, be opportunistic, use aggressive voice, and be
neglectful.
Available alternatives
Available alternatives refer to the extent to which a partner firm possesses attractive
alternatives that could enable managers to attain their firms’ objectives (Ping, 1993, 1999).
The availability of attractive alternatives provides managers with a source of power over
the situation (Emerson, 1962), whereas a dearth of alternatives increases their dependence
on counterparts (Emerson, 1962; Joshi and Arnold, 1997). The latter adverse situation
pressures alliance managers to respond and preserve the current relationship (Provan and
Skinner, 1989). Furthermore, alliance managers with attractive alternatives may feel less
positive toward their present relationship and be less willing to act on the alliance’s behalf
(Withey and Cooper, 1989). Conversely, alliance managers with no alternative partners
feel positively about the present relationship and act on the alliance’s behalf.
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Because partners without attractive alternatives depend on their current
relationships, managers have strong incentives to make the relationship work. They
likely act constructively to protect the relationship by using responses such as creative
voice (Amabile, 1988), considerate voice (Ping, 1997), and patience (Ping, 1993).
Moreover, if managers perceive no other alternatives for achieving their firm’s
strategic objectives, they have no choice than to continue the current relationship,
which decreases the likelihood of negligence and exit (Ping, 1993, 1999). The absence of
attractive alternatives also increases the relative value of the alliance and decreases the
likelihood that managers act destructively through opportunism or aggressive voice
( Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Provan and Skinner, 1989).
Empirical research supports these relationships. Ping (1993) reveals that the lack of
alternative attractiveness negatively influences exit, opportunism, and neglect but is
not significantly associated with (considerate) voice or patience. However, the
relationship with (considerate) voice later receives support (Ping, 1999). In addition,
Hibbard et al. (2001) find that firms’ dependence, measured in terms of alternative
availability, positively influences patience and negatively influences neglect, though
the negative relationship they hypothesize between dependence and venting (i.e.
aggressive voice) is not statistically significant. However, case examples presented by
Lax and Sebenius (1985) provide some anecdotal support for this negative relationship.
Other empirical research supports relationships between the availability of
attractive alternatives and response strategies. In a study of R&D alliances in the
biotechnology industry, Deeds and Hill (1998) uncover a significant negative
relationship between a partner’s dependence due to a lack of alternatives and the use of
opportunistic behavior. Similarly, Luo (2007) finds that in low growth industries, where
the availability of alternatives is minimal, opportunism is more likely, and Joshi and
Arnold (1997) show that when relational norms are low, the lack of alternatives
increases opportunism. Provan and Skinner (1989) support a positive relationship
between alternatives and neglect; Olk and Young (1997) suggest a lack of alternatives
relates positively to exit. Finally, in a more general organizational context, Amabile
(1988) argues that external pressures, such as the lack of alternatives, may push people
to be more creative to solve an adverse situation. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H5 Compared with alliance managers who perceive many attractive alternatives,
alliance managers who perceive few attractive alternatives are more likely to
use patience and considerate and creative voices but are less likely to use exit,
act opportunistically, use aggressive voice, and be neglectful.
Interaction between alliance-specific investments and available alternatives
Alliance-specific investments and the lack of available alternatives likely interact and
influence the use of response strategies. Because they constitute two different types of
exit barriers, they should reinforce each other (Ping, 1997). Therefore, when
alliance-specific investments exist but attractive alternatives are lacking, alliance
managers perceive greater dependence on the current relationship, which makes exit
less likely. Constructive responses, such as considerate and creative voices, are far
more likely. The high exit costs (Ping, 1997) make the current relationship appear more
valuable, so managers should seek collaboration with their partner. In contrast, even if
firms have made substantial alliance-specific investments, when they have other
alternatives available, managers may act patiently and less aggressively and
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opportunistically, because they seek a balance between protecting their investments
and waiting to act on more-attractive alternatives. If the firm has fewer alliance-specific
investments but lacks available alternatives, managers’ responses are constrained,
requiring that they respond constructively. Finally, when a firm has made few
alliance-specific investments but has plentiful alternatives, alliance managers likely
exploit their dominant position by threatening to terminate the relationship without
worrying about exit costs (Ping, 1997). These alliance managers may act to pursue
their individual interests by engaging in opportunism, acting aggressively, or exiting
the alliance (Ping, 1993). Therefore, we hypothesize:
H6 A positive interaction effect exists between alliance-specific investments and
attractive alternative availability for an alliance manager’s likelihood of using
the seven response strategies. When alliance-specific investments are high
(low), the effect of lack of attractive alternative availability is stronger
(weaker).
Methodology
To test the hypotheses, we design an experimental scenario-based study, a
methodology with a long tradition in the decision sciences that has proved useful
for the study of major strategic decisions, because it provides an examination of the
causal relationships between predictors and outcomes in controlled conditions
(Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Croson et al., 2007). Managerial behavior depends on a
variety of contextual influences (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989), and these experiments
control for confounding effects. Furthermore, the use of experiments eliminates
endogeneity concerns (Echambadi et al., 2006). We also use scenarios, rather than real
situations, because of the potentially sensitive nature of the questions; respondents
may not answer questions about adverse situations in which they were involved
openly (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972). However, as recommended by Croson et al. (2007)
and to improve the external validity, we develop scenarios that represent realistic
alliance situations in which the predictors might operate. Furthermore, to avoid any
priming effects, the respondents confront choices with uncertain and interdependent
outcomes in settings in which the behavior, outcomes, and rules are not perfectly clear
(Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994).
Data collection
We use MBA students as respondents, which may raise concerns about the degree to
which alliance managers respond similarly (Peterson, 2001) but does not inhibit the
validity of the extension of the EVLN typology, which requires an assessment of the
response strategies’ psychometric properties. For such an assessment, it is more
appropriate to use a homogeneous group of respondents ( Joshi and Arnold, 1997;
Peterson, 2001). Furthermore, previous research provides evidence that managers’ and
students’ responses converge in similar decision situations (Bateman and Zeithaml,
1989).
We collect the data during class meetings; if students agree to participate in the
experiment about strategic alliances, they receive a document containing the scenario
and a series of questions. The two-page document contains four parts: The first section
includes a randomly selected scenario that introduces an adverse situation in a
strategic alliance context; the following section features a list of items pertaining to the
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evaluation of response strategies; and the proceeding sections contain the
manipulation check questions, as well as control variables. Participants read the
instructions and scenario carefully and answer the questions as if they were the
manager of the alliance. The sample consists of 303 respondents, with an average age
of 26.3 years, 65.7 per cent of who are men.
Scenario manipulations
To capture the adverse situations, we manipulate economic satisfaction, social
satisfaction, alliance-specific investments, and availability of alternatives. The
experiment uses a four-factor (exchange variables) by two level (positive versus
negative) between-subjects design, in which we combine the manipulations to form 16
different scenarios, from which we remove the all-positive scenario because the pretest
indicates this situation is not perceived as adverse.
For the economic satisfaction manipulation, we vary the economic outcomes of the
alliance; namely, the firm earns financial benefits either beyond or below its
expectations (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). The manipulation of social satisfaction
varies the perception of the quality of relationship with the partner firm, such that a
good relationship means the firms have developed a relationship characterized by
trust, commitment, and adaptability (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). To manipulate
alliance-specific investments, we vary the extent to which the focal firm had made
specific investments in the alliance as minor or substantial (Ping, 1993). Finally, we
address the availability of alternatives by manipulating the extent to which the focal
firm had access to other ways to realize its objectives, whether many alternatives
available or only a few (Ping, 1993).
Consistent with the scenario-based experiment method (Perdue and Summers,
1986), we assess the degree to which respondents understand the scenarios with four
manipulation-check items, such that each question pertains to a manipulation. To test
for the effect of these manipulations, we subject the items to a four-factor multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA). The effects of the four factors are strongly significant
at 1 per cent, which indicates that the respondents understand the manipulations.
Furthermore, to ensure the manipulations are independent and that there are no
confounding effects, we examine the interaction terms (Perdue and Summers, 1986)
and find that none of them is significant.
Response strategy measures
To operationalize the seven response strategies, we turn to existing scales and, when
necessary, adapt them to the context of strategic alliances. We measure exit with items
pertaining to whether the respondent intends to end the relationship or stop doing
business with the partner (Ping, 1993, Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Rusbult et al.,
1988). The measures for opportunism, adapted from John (1984) and Ping (1993),
include withholding information, exaggerating the adverse nature of the situation, and
escaping from contractual obligations. Aggressive voice items refer to forcefully
pushing a solution or being persistent (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). For creative voice, we
use items related to the creation of innovative and creative solutions or fresh ideas
(Zhou and George, 2001). To measure considerate voice, the items indicate working to
create a consensus and finding a solution satisfactory and acceptable for everyone
(Ping, 1993; Rusbult et al., 1982). We operationalize patience with items such as
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optimistically waiting for better times and trusting that the situation will solve by itself
(Ping, 1993; Rusbult et al., 1982). For neglect, the items refer to not dealing with the
issue, not putting additional effort into the relationship, and not presenting initiatives
to improve the situation (Ping, 1993). All these measures use seven-point Likert scales,
ranging from “I would definitely not react in this way” (1) to “I would definitely react in
this way” (7). In Table I, we provide the wording of these items.
Control variables
We also measure several variables to control for individual differences, including an
M-C2 version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Strahan and Gerbasi,
1972), because some response strategies may be more socially desirable (e.g.
considerate voice) than others (e.g. opportunism). A single item assesses the perception
of the severity of the problem, which can influence the use of response strategies (e.g.
Richins, 1983). Furthermore, potentially influential demographic characteristics of the
respondents, such as age and gender (e.g. Rusbult et al., 1988), are also included in the
survey.
Results
We conduct two sets of analyses to examine the data. First, we analyze the extension of
the EVLN model with aggressive voice, creative voice, and opportunism to determine if
the three response strategies are distinct constructs. A series of confirmatory factor
analyses (CFA) assesses the degree to which the seven-factor model fits the data better
than alternative models. The CFAs also evaluate the convergent and discriminant
validity of the response strategies. Second, to examine the relationships among the four
exchange variables and the response strategies, we conduct a multivariate analysis of
covariance (MANCOVA), followed by a series of univariate post-hoc analyses to test
the hypotheses.
Construct validity of the seven response strategies
Using AMOS 7.0 for the CFA (Arbuckle, 2006; Byrne, 2001), we first estimate the most
restrictive form of the full measurement model, which comprises 35 items to measure
the seven response strategies (i.e. model 1). Each item was only allowed to load on its
corresponding construct, and we posit that errors are uncorrelated. For scaling
purposes, we fix the loading of the first indicators to 1. Maximum likelihood estimates
the model parameters, because the data do not strongly violate multivariate normality
assumptions (McDonald and Ho, 2002).
To assess the psychometric properties of the model, we examine the error variances,
correlations, standard errors, goodness-of-fit indices, and factor loadings (Byrne, 2001).
The error-variances are all positive and do not significantly differ from 0. Correlations
are not greater than 1, and standard errors are not too large. Consistent with common
practice (Byrne, 2001; Hu and Bentler, 1999), we use multiple indices to estimate model fit
(see Table II). The normed chi-square, for which a value of less than 3.0 indicates good fit
(Carmines and McIver, 1981), suggests acceptable fit with a value of 1.79. A root mean
squared error of approximation (RMSEA) value of .051 (90 per cent confidence interval
(CI): 0.046-0.056) and a square root mean residual (SRMR) value of 0.073 also are
acceptable (Hu and Bentler, 1999). However, other goodness-of-fit indices indicate a
relatively poor fit; the goodness-of-fit index (GFI) ¼ 0.84, adjusted goodness-of-fit index
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(AGFI) ¼ 0.82, and comparative fit index (CFI) ¼ 0.89 are lower than their respective
threshold values (Hu and Bentler, 1999). More important, further analysis indicates that
four item loadings (i.e. Cre3, Pat5, Neg3, and Neg5) fall below the acceptable threshold
value of 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), and five other items (i.e. Agr1, Agr2, Op4, Op5,
and Con2) possess high cross-loadings, which necessitates a respecification of the model
(Byrne, 2001).
We remove the nine invalid items and estimate a second seven-factor model with
only 26 items. Our analysis of model 2 reveals no offending estimates. Moreover,
compared with model 1, we find improved goodness-of-fit indices (see Table II). The
normed chi-square value of 1.51 indicates good fit, as do the values of the other
goodness-of-fit indices, namely, 0.90 (GFI), 0.88 (AGFI), 0.95 (CFI), 0.041 (RMSEA) (90
per cent CI: 0.033-0.049), and 0.056 (SRMR). To assess convergent validity, we examine
the factor loadings; they are all highly significant and range from 0.54 to 0.91 (see
Table I). To assess reliability, we use Cronbach’s alpha coefficients; the results indicate
values ranging from 0.69 to 0.91, with only one exception (neglect ¼ 0.63), which
suggests acceptable reliability (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). To assess discriminant
validity, we compare the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) with the
correlations between the constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). For model 2, the
square root of the AVE values range from 0.60 to 0.82, greater than any of the pairwise
correlations (jrj , 0:51) reported in Table III.
Consistent with established procedures to assess the degree of discriminant validity
(Byrne, 2001), we also estimate three alternative models (see Table II). In model 3a, we
load all items on a single factor as a baseline. In model 3b, to establish the validity of the
supplementary response strategies, we force opportunism, neglect, and exit to load on the
same factor, whereas in the Model 3c, we combine the three types of voices on the same
factor. The results indicate that the best fitting model is the seven-factor model with 26
items (model 2), as supported by chi-square difference tests. A comparison of model 2
(x 2 ¼ 452:15) with model 3a (x2 ¼ 2032:81) yields a significant chi-square difference of
1,580.67 (p , 0:001). In addition, the significant differences in chi-square values with
respect to model 3b (Dx2 ¼ 502:43; p , 0:001) and model 3c (Dx 2 ¼ 472:31; p , 0:001)
indicate that opportunism, aggressive voice, and creative voice depict distinct constructs,
distinguishable from the generic EVLN response strategies.
Impact of exchange variables on response strategies
As our second objective, we examine the effect of the four exchange variables on the
seven response strategies. Because the response strategies are interrelated, we
manipulate the exchange variables, and we use covariates to control for confounding
effects, a MANCOVA is the most appropriate method (Hair et al., 1998). We conduct a
general linear model MANCOVA because of the between-subject design and unequal cell
sizes. Next, we ran univariate post-hoc analyses to test the hypotheses and interpret the
effects of the exchange variables (Hair et al., 1998). In this analysis, we use the average
scores for each of the seven response strategies as dependent variables and the dummy
variables from the scenario manipulations as the fixed factors. Gender, age, problem
severity, and social desirability enter the analysis as covariates. We test the interaction
effects among the predictors and, for parsimony, remove those that are insignificant.
Before conducting the analysis, we examine the MANCOVA assumptions but
find no violations. The sample of 303, with 15 cells, offers a sufficient number of
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respondents to conduct the analysis (Hair et al., 1998). The omnibus MANCOVA test
comparing the adverse situations indicates significant differences among the exchange
variables. Specifically, the results reveal significant Wilks’ lambdas for the four
variables: economic satisfaction (L ¼ 0.91, F ¼ 3.96, p , 0.001), social satisfaction
(L ¼ 0.89, F ¼ 5.03, p , 0.001), alliance-specific investments (L ¼ 0.94, F ¼ 2.46,
p , 0.05), and alternative availability (L ¼ 0.83, F ¼ 8.20, p , 0.001). The two
hypothesized two-way interactions are also significant: between economic and social
satisfaction (L ¼ 0.95, F ¼ 2.19, p , 0.05) and between alliance-specific investments
and alternative availability (L ¼ 0.95, F ¼ 2.06, p , 0.05). Furthermore, three of the
four control variables are significant: gender (L ¼ 0.92, F ¼ 3.55, p , 0.001), problem
severity (L ¼ 0.93, F ¼ 3.00, p , 0.01), and social desirability (L ¼ 0.92, F ¼ 3.62,
p , 0.001). However, age is not significant (L ¼ 0.96, F ¼ 1.55, p ¼ 0.15). The
F-values of the corrected model, which reflect variations in the response strategies
attributable to the exchange variables and covariates, show significant results for all
seven-response strategies (see Table IV).
The post-hoc one-way ANOVAs and t-tests use a Bonferroni adjustment to control
for Type I errors (Hair et al., 1998). The difference between low and high economic
satisfaction is significant for exit (F ¼ 7:76; p , 0:001), aggressive voice
(F ¼ 7:82; p , 0:001), and patience (F ¼ 8:37; p , 0:001) and marginally significant
for creative voice (F ¼ 3:48; p , 0:10) (Table IV). That is, exit, aggressive voice, and
creative voice are more likely among respondents who are dissatisfied with the
economic performance of the alliance, whereas patience is more likely among
respondents with a higher satisfaction level. The difference between low and high
social satisfaction also is significant for exit (F ¼ 26.80, p , 0.001) and opportunism
(F ¼ 4.16, p, 0.05) but marginally significant for aggressive voice (F ¼ 2.71, p, 0.10)
and patience (F ¼ 3:26; p , 0:10). The post hoc analysis indicates that respondents
who perceive lower quality relationship thus are more likely to choose exit and
opportunism in response to an adverse situation, and those who have a high quality
relationship are more likely to be patient.
We also uncover a negative interaction effect between economic and social
satisfaction, such that the interaction is significant for exit (F ¼ 7:33; p , 0:001),
creative voice (F ¼ 5:39; p , 0:05), and considerate voice (F ¼ 8:21; p , 0:001). Post
hoc analysis indicates that respondents dissatisfied with the economic performance of
the alliance but satisfied with its relational quality are less likely to exit and more likely
to use creative and considerate voice, compared with those who are dissatisfied with
relational quality. In contrast, respondents who are satisfied with economic
performance are not likely to exit, though if they also are satisfied with the quality
of the alliance relationship, they become less likely to use creative and considerate
voice than if they were dissatisfied.
Furthermore, the findings indicate that the difference between few and substantial
investments is significant for exit (F ¼ 8:47; p , 0:001), neglect (F ¼ 7:23; p , 0:01),
and considerate voice (F ¼ 6:70; p , 0:05). Fewer alliance-specific investments
increase a respondent’s likelihood to dissolve the relationship and be neglectful,
whereas more investments foster considerate voice. The difference between alternative
availability and unavailability is significant for exit (F ¼ 46:23; p , 0:001), creative
voice (F ¼ 3:36; p , 0:05), and considerate voice (F ¼ 15:98; p , 0:001). The post hoc
analysis suggests that respondents are more likely to exit an adverse situation when
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they have more alternatives available, whereas when they lack alternatives, they select
responses such as creative and considerate voices.
The interaction between alliance-specific investments and alternative availability is
significant for opportunism (F ¼ 6:31; p , 0:05) and aggressive voice
(F ¼ 8:21; p , 0:001), such that respondents with significant alliance-specific
investments and available alternatives tend to behave opportunistically and
aggressively voice their concerns. However, when they lack alternatives, they
become less opportunistic and aggressive. Those respondents without significant
alliance-specific investments but with alternatives available are not likely to act
opportunistically or use aggressive voice; when they lack alternatives, they may use
these responses to a certain extent.
Of the control variables, gender, problem severity, and social desirability have
significant effects. Gender influences opportunism (F ¼ 10:87; p , 0:001), creative
voice (F ¼ 6:07; p , 0:01), and considerate (F ¼ 5:93; p , 0:01), as confirmed by
post-hoc, one-way ANOVAs that show male respondents are more likely to use
opportunism and less likely to use creative and considerate voices than are female
respondents. Problem severity also influences patience (F ¼ 13:21; p , 0:001) and
neglect (F ¼ 5:51; p , 0:05); the post-hoc t-tests reveal that the more severe the
perceptions of the situation, the less likely respondents are to be patient and neglectful.
Finally, as expected, social desirability has a significant effect on the likelihood of
several response strategies: exit (F ¼ 3:95; p , 0:05), opportunism (F ¼ 14.05,
p , 0.001), considerate voice (F ¼ 5:22; p , 0:05), patience (F ¼ 4:13; p , 0:01), and
marginally aggressive voice (F ¼ 3:28; p , 0:10). Respondents with high scores on the
social desirability scale tend not to exit, act opportunistically, or use aggressive voice
but instead employ considerate voice and are more patient than respondents with low
social desirability scores.
A breakdown of the hypothesis tests shows that of the 28 hypothesized direct
relationships, 14 (50.0 per cent) are supported, 14 are not significant, and none
contradicts the hypothesized direction (see Table V). Of the 14 interaction effects
hypothesized, five (35.7 per cent) receive support, and the remainder is not significant.
We discuss these results in more detail in the next section.
Discussion
Extant alliance research demonstrates that partners can overcome adverse situations
and steer their strategic alliances toward success. The central objective of our research
is to provide insight into which response strategy alliance managers use to react to
undesirable circumstances. Therefore, we refine the EVLN typology and extend it to
seven response strategies. We split voice into three different forms – considerate,
creative, and aggressive – and add opportunism. The data support the extended
typology and indicate that adverse situations, through the four exchange variables,
directly and interactively influence the use of response strategies.
Our findings validate but also extend prior alliance research on response strategies.
Together, they provide support for the investment model (Rusbult et al., 1982), which
suggests that exchange conditions influence decision making within strategic
alliances, as in other contexts. Our results are consistent with those of Ping (1993, 1999)
and Hibbard et al. (2001), who show that dissatisfaction and alternative availability
stimulate exit. They also find that alliance-specific investment foster considerate voice
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and reduce patience (Ping, 1993, 2003). Our findings further validate those of Geyskens
and Steenkamp (2000), who reveal that economic satisfaction reduces the likelihood of
exit and fosters patience, whereas social satisfaction reduces the likelihood of both exit
and patience (see Table V).
Our findings further reveal some novel insights. Ping (1993) finds no significant
effect of satisfaction on opportunism, whereas we suggest that his result may have
been caused by a confounding effect between economic and social satisfaction. By
distinguishing between these forms of satisfaction, we reveal that social satisfaction
only, and not economic satisfaction, stimulates the use of opportunism. Contrary to the
surprising findings of Ping (1993), we also find that alliance-specific investments, not
just lack of alternatives, have negative effects on exit. As hypothesized, we uncover a
negative effect of social satisfaction on aggressive voice (not significant in Hibbard
et al., 2001) and a negative effect of economic satisfaction on creative voice (not
significant in Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Furthermore, by splitting voice into
three distinct types, we present a finer-grained understanding of this complex
construct (Kay, 1989; Withey and Cooper, 1989). In terms of satisfaction, aggressive
voice depends on both economic and social satisfaction, whereas creative voice is
influenced only by economic satisfaction, and considerate voice receives no impact
from either type. Similarly, in terms of exit barriers, alliance-specific investments and a
lack of attractive alternatives influence considerate voice, only the lack of alternatives
affects creative voice, and neither barrier influences aggressive voice.
The presence of negative interaction effects between economic and social
satisfaction, described by Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) in the case of exit, also
appears to affect creative voice and considerate voice. Finally, we find a positive
interaction effect between alliance-specific investments and lack of alternatives on
opportunism and aggressive voice, relationships that have never been tested before.
Additional insights
Two of our findings deserve further elaboration. First, consistent with prior response
strategy research (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Hibbard
et al., 2001; Ping, 1993, 1999; Rusbult et al., 1988), we uncover a relatively high number
of insignificant relationships among exchange variables and response strategies. One
explanation for this result, offered by Hagedoorn et al. (1999), suggests that response
strategies may be organized around the circumference of a circle. Consistent with such
a circumplex structure, the impact of an exchange variable should follow a sinusoidal
relationship, implying a pattern of significant positive, insignificant, significant
negative associations (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). Our results seem to exhibit such a
structure, in that the pattern of correlations among the seven response strategies takes
the following order: exit, opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate
voice, patience, and neglect – a pattern also observed in Withey and Cooper’s (1989)
and Ping’s (1999) results. However, further research should investigate the structure of
and interrelatedness among these response strategies.
Second, we adapt the investment model developed by Rusbult et al. (1982) to the
context of strategic alliances. This model focuses on relationship-level explanations,
but we also find significant effects of individual-level variables, such as gender and
social desirability. Therefore, alliance conditions and individual characteristics both
appear to influence the use of response strategies. These findings suggest that research
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might complement the investment model with individual attributes. Withey and
Cooper (1989) similarly find that locus of control, as a personality trait, has a
significant effect on voice, loyalty, and neglect. Other relevant individual traits, such as
leadership style and attributions, should be investigated as well. Furthermore, by
using an experimental design, we control for the impact of environmental conditions
(Croson et al., 2007) and eliminate potentially influential external effects (Luo, 2007).
Developing and testing hypotheses that specify relationships among environmental
conditions, relationship factors, manager traits, and response strategy would be
consistent with Chatman’s (1989) recommendations to improve interactional
organizational research.
Limitations
Additional research should replicate our results with practicing alliance managers.
Although the use of MBA students is appropriate for our research objectives, input
from alliance managers would be valuable. Furthermore, because we manipulate the
independent variables, the external validity of the findings may be of concern.
However, given the theory-development and causality objectives of this study, an
experiment remains more suitable than other data collection methods (Croson et al.,
2007). We also measure behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors. Although
intentions are not always flawless predictors of behavior, our approach attempts to
assess the intensity of the likelihood of response strategies, an objective achieved more
readily by measuring behavioral intention rather than behaviors. However, a field
study focusing on alliance managers’ behavior would complement our findings.
The scenario-based experiment we use is cross-sectional, which prevents us from
providing explanations of response strategy dynamics. For example, research might
design longitudinal experiments to examine the evolution of alliance managers’
responses over time to shifting adverse situations. In addition, building on the work of
Doz (1996) and Arin˜o and De la Torre (1998), research could conduct longitudinal case
studies to explore whether partners’ interactions depict particular response strategy
patterns. The identification of such patterns may help alliance managers anticipate
their counterparts’ behavior and overcome adverse situations more effectively.
Within alliance literature, the so-called “structure perspective” states that initial
alliance conditions influence alliance performance. More recently, a process perspective
has emerged, advocating that managers can deal with unforeseen circumstances and
overcome the limitations of initial alliance designs. Our study contributes to this
process perspective by highlighting the various response strategies that alliance
managers use to deal with adverse situations and their antecedents.
Note
1. Leck and Saunders (1992) propose the term “patience” to refer to loyalty as a behavioral
response and reserve the term “loyalty” for the attitudinal component of the construct, in line
with Hirschman’s (1970) original conceptualization.
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